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The purpose of this article is to challenge scholars of corporate social responsibility and CSR officers of private
corporations to rethink their subject matter and their approach. The fundamental problem that needs to be
addressed in CSR scholarship is whether it is descriptive or normative or something else. I maintain that much
of the current literature is inadequately descriptive and philosophically deficient with regard to norms. I suggest
a number of additional activities for CSR research (e.g., consumer responsibility) compatible with a morally
pluralistic world that is hospitable to a market economy.Introduction
The purpose of this essay is to challenge scholars of cor-
porate social responsibility and CSR officers of private
corporations to rethink their subject matter and their
approach. In order to raise this challenge and to provoke
further discussion, I have deliberately chosen to over-
state my case. With that caveat in mind, let us begin.The administrative fallacy
The fundamental problem that needs to be addressed in
CSR scholarship is whether it is descriptive or normative or
something else (Crane et al. 2008). This is a problem rooted
in both philosophy and the history of the social sciences.
The great success of the scientific revolution in the 17th
and 18th-centuries gave rise to a new intellectual attitude:
the Enlightenment Project (Adorno & Horkheimer 1990;
Carl Becker 1962; Bloom 1987; Capaldi 1998; MacIntyre
1981; McCarthy 1998). The Enlightenment Project asserts
that there can be a social science comparable to physical
science, that social science can help us explain, predict,
and control the social world. In short, there is the belief
that there can eventually be a social technology. The dream
of a social technological utopia is the common inheritance
of liberals, socialists, and Marxists ((Carl Becker 1962),
chapter four). Some of us would argue this is delusional
and misguided.
It is precisely this belief in a social technology that in-
forms much of the social science disciplines those trainedCorrespondence: nick.capaldi@gmail.com
Loyola University, New Orleans, USA
© 2016 Capaldi. Open Access This article is dis
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/b
medium, provided you give appropriate credit
license, and indicate if changes were made.in the social sciences and, ultimately, therefore many prac-
titioners in the CSR field. There are academicians ever
ready to play the part of Philosopher Kings and Queens. In
his critique of what he calls the entrepreneurial society,
George Brenkert (long time editor of Business Ethics Quar-
terly) warns that “instead, then, of a Platonic society, which
looked to its philosopher kings, our entrepreneurial society
will look to its entrepreneur bosses.” ((Brenkert 2002) p. 17).
A large part of the hostility of many intellectuals to modern
commercial societies is that such societies are not enter-
prise associations requiring a clerisy (De Jouvenel 1974;
Klein 2006; Mises 1975; Nozick 1998; Schumpeter 1975).
“…intellectuals also detested Americanism for a
more personal reason. They knew that in an
Americanized society, dominated by commercial
culture, the place of philosophers and literati was
marginal at best. Far from being the dogma by
downtrodden peasant, Occidentalism more often
reflects the fears and prejudices of urban
intellectuals, who feel displaced in a world of mass
commerce” ((Buruma & Margalit 2005), p. 30).
Prior to the modern (Renaissance) period, classical and
medieval theorists asserted the existence of a universal
teleology. Everything, including the human and social
world, was governed by an internal telos (goal). From this
perspective, describing and normatizing amount to the
same thing. All of that came to an end when modern
physics (Descartes, Newton) denied the existence of final
causes and therefore denied the existence of teleology intributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
y/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons
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modeled along the lines of modern physics, then it cannot
appeal to objective internal norms or a telos.
It is the Enlightenment Project mentality that obfuscates
the distinction between describing and explaining the
inherent norms of commercial activity along with an
internal critique of when we fail to instantiate those norms
as opposed to normative CSR which proscribes, presum-
ably, from a purely external position what participants in
commerce should be doing. Where do these external
norms originate? Do these external norms reflect a private
political agenda or do they reflect a larger social structure?
Who has correctly apprehended that larger social struc-
ture? Is that structure defensible? How so?
It is not my purpose to denigrate advocacy of any kind
or to inhibit political, social, and economic reform. It is
my purpose to point out that this is not scholarship.
One may use scholarship to support advocacy but advo-
cacy is more than scholarship, and, by itself, scholarship
does not entail specific reforms or agendas. To engage
in advocacy under the guise of scholarship is to reflect
either intellectual confusion or intellectual dishonesty.
There are numerous histories of CSR (Carroll 2008).
Relative to my concern with the administrative fallacy, I
offer another such history as it emerged in the U.S.
(Ryan 2006). The field of CSR was economically and
politically liberal because of its origins in business
schools and philosophy departments. With regard to
business schools, it can be traced back to the University
of California-Berkeley in the 1960s, where many of the
first leaders of the nascent Business and Society field
worked or were trained (Epstein 1999). Research focused
on corporations’ “social responsibilities” and sought
economic reforms to assuage the inequalities perceived
to be inherent in capitalism (Jones 1980).
With regard to philosophy, philosophers’ traditionally
“hostile attitudes” toward business ((Shaw 1996): 490)
became immediately evident. They used a specific political
agenda to “understand, assess, and perhaps modify the
socioeconomic context…that frame[s] the moral choices
that confront individuals,” often leading to critiques from
a Marxist or immoral-market perspective ((Shaw 1996):
496). Others focused the attention of students on corpora-
tions’ social responsibilities, questioning whether firms
should do “more” than maximize profits.
Philosophy has a specific role comprised of two parts,
pedagogical and cultural. The pedagogical role is making
us self-conscious, aware of our basic presuppositions.
This is analysis; it can be taught; and it can be practiced
outside of the discipline, the profession and the acad-
emy. The cultural role is the fashioning of a narrative
that brings the presuppositions of an entire array of cul-
tural practices into some sort of coherent synthesis. This
is a role that has been unique to philosophy or to thosewe identify as great philosophers, even though many of
them have played that role outside of the academy.
This second role is not an authoritative role. An indi-
vidual thinker may choose to do both. However, the
legitimacy of the policies derived from the vision in no
way follow from the value of the vision. Others can in
retrospect appreciate the value and importance and in-
fluence of the vision without endorsing the derived
policies. We value Aristotle’s analysis of the polis, but
most of us would choose not to live in one. To engage
in this activity is to offer a vision, not an argument,
although the vision may contain arguments within it.
Identifying presuppositions is different from the appli-
cation of those presuppositions or the challenging of
some of those presuppositions in the light of others. It
is a role that acknowledges the freedom of the imagin-
ation, the autonomy of choice, and in the contemporary
context the goodness or validity of a civil association. It
is a role that can never be played by self-alienated and
self-proclaimed elites who strive to reveal to others
their respective roles and beliefs and actions within an
enterprise association, that is, an association with a col-
lective goal to which individual goals are subordinate.
Many prominent members of the philosophy profession
are so unreflectively hostile to modern commercial so-
cieties that they have incapacitated themselves from
providing a vision: Rorty, MacIntyre, Blackburn, Derrida,
Foucault, to name just a few. A large part of the hostility of
many intellectuals to modern commercial societies is that
such societies are not enterprise associations requiring a
clerisy Hollander (Hollander 2006). Philosophy, for many,
is the articulation of a moral vision (an alternative vision)
for those hostile to substantive religious communities.
Even so-called empirical research was tainted by a
bias. One study claimed that undergraduate business
students were overwhelmingly “utilitarian egoists”
(Wood et al. 1998), and another that MBA students were
egoistic. The assumption in both studies was that “egoism”
is of the “subjective” variety, emphasizing maximizing one’s
subjective view of one’s own good in the short term and
ignoring the consequences for others. This study, of course,
ignores other variants of philosophical egoism. These
studies reinforce the assumption that business students,
and ultimately business persons, are morally wanting.
The field’s most successful assault on free-market
thinking is “stakeholder theory,” which claims that the
corporate executive’s job is to balance the needs and
desires of all the corporate constituencies (Donaldson &
Preston 1995). That position is contrasted in the litera-
ture with “stockholder theory,” which generally follows
Friedmans (Friedman 1970) position that executives
should maximize profits “within the rules of the game.”
We ignore for the moment whether this is an accurate
account of Friedman. What needs to be emphasized is
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theory initially and later when business people attempted
to apply it in practice. According to the Business Round
Table:
[1990] Corporations are chartered to serve both their
shareholders and society as a whole. The interests of the
shareholders are primarily measured in terms of eco-
nomic return over time. The interests for others in
society (other stakeholders) are defined by their rela-
tionship to the corporation….The thrust of history and
law strongly supports the broader view of the directors’
responsibility to carefully weigh the interests of all
stakeholders as part of their responsibility to the corpor-
ation or to the long term interests of its shareholders.
(“Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness,”
March 1990)
[1997] The weakness of the stakeholder model is the
absence of an overall objective function which impli-
citly or explicitly specifies the tradeoffs from expendi-
tures on various items, including each of the firm’s
stakeholders. This in turn implies that the top man-
agers of such organizations cannot be held accountable
for their decisions because without an overall objective
function, there is no way to measure and evaluate their
performance….it would leave the board with no criterion
for resolving conflicts between interests of stockholders
and of other stakeholders or among different groups of
stakeholders. (“Statement on Corporate Governance,”
September 1997, pp. 3–4).
Two other things need to be emphasized, and both of
them concern how executives are supposed to balance
various claims. First, Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative
destruction’ is not only an economic concept calling at-
tention to how entrepreneurship in a dynamic economy
constantly changes the economic landscape: what we
produce and do not produce; how we produce it; how
we organize production, distribution, marketing, finan-
cing, etc. It also applies to changes in the social world
that reflect changes in the economic world. For example,
think of how economic growth and globalization led to
the greater participation of women in the workforce.
Think again of how that participation has radically al-
tered not only the workplace but the relationship be-
tween men and women, family life, etc. Not only have
we not caught up to digesting these changes, but we also
have to ask ourselves what other changes are percolating
or will develop. If so, how do we know we are balancing
claims now in a way that will evolve positively in regard
to future developments? The answer is we do not know,
we cannot know, and there can certainly be conflicting
approaches.
Second, taking Archie Carroll’s pyramid as our frame of
reference, we might want, and I certainly do, to challenge
the notion that we live or ever have lived or expect to livein a morally monistic world. Let me suggest that we live in
morally pluralistic world (all of past history and current
events are my evidence). Let me suggest that this is some-
times a good thing. If all of the foregoing is true, then
there is no single way to balance claims, no algorithm that
we can discern or teach.
A serious scholarly review of the philosophical literature
will reveal that there is no consensus on resolving ethical
disputes at the highest level (Solomon 2006). To begin
with, it is not only the case that there are significant
ethical disagreements about substantive issues. Many if
not most of these controversies do not appear to be resolv-
able through sound rational argument. Again, many of
the controversies depend upon different foundational
metaphysical commitments. In most metaphysical con-
troversies resolution is possible only through the grant-
ing of particular initial premises and rules of evidence.
Even when foundational metaphysical issues do not
appear to be at stake, the debates turn on different rank-
ings of the good. Resolution does not appear to be feasible
without begging the question, arguing in a circle, or en-
gaging in infinite regress. We cannot appeal to conse-
quences without knowing how to rank the impact of
different approaches with regard to different ethical inter-
ests (liberty, equality, prosperity, security, etc.). Nor can
we appeal to preference satisfaction unless one already
grants how one will correct preferences and compare ra-
tional versus impassioned preferences, as well as calculate
the discount rate for preferences over time. Any Appeal to
disinterested observers, hypothetical choosers, or hypo-
thetical contractors will not avail either, because if such
decision makers are truly disinterested, they will choose
nothing. To choose in a particular way, one must already
be fitted out with a particular moral sense or thin theory
of the good. Intuitions can be met with contrary intui-
tions. Any particular balancing of claims can be countered
with a different way of achieving a balance. In order to
appeal for guidance to any account of moral rationality
one must already have secured the content for that moral
rationality.
Management, marketing, social science and norms
There is one particular misguided tendency in social
science research in general and CSR research in par-
ticular to which I wish to call attention. Again, it con-
cerns the seeming inability of some researchers to deal
with norms as opposed to facts. I call attention to the
following abstract:
Although prior research provides significant evidence
that political ideology (i.e. liberal or conservative) can
influence an individual’s views about gender roles in
economic life, little is known about whether these
views influence organizations. In this work, we
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have higher (lower) rates of gender inequality in the
training, promotion, and turnover of their subordinates,
relative to moderate managers. We further theorize that
conservative (liberal) managers will be less (more) likely
to lead their firm’s diversity initiatives, relative to
moderate managers. Using novel microdata from the
legal services industry, we find support for the majority
of our arguments (Carnahan & Greenwood 2016).
Aside from some fuzzy definitions of what it means to
be ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’, the article tells us that
‘liberal’ managers tend to be more accommodating to di-
versity programs, and it is the opposite for ‘conserva-
tives’. Do we need empirical research to tell us this? Isn’t
this part of what it means in certain contexts to be
‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’? This is not an empirical finding
but a matter of definition. This is like conducting a poll
to determine if all bachelors are unmarried males! Does
this research show us that diversity programs are good
or bad and, if so, relative to what criteria? Is this so-
called research meant to lead to the recommendation of
CSR policy that ‘conservative’ managers should be fired?
Replaced? Sent to sensitivity sessions?
Spontaneous order
Although I cannot elaborate on it at length here, I want
to suggest that the social world has to be understood in
Hayekian terms. The social world is neither a mechan-
ism nor organic. It is historical and evolving. Within it,
one can discern two kinds of ‘order’: made order and
spontaneous order. ‘Made order’ organizations exhibit
exogenous order. This means that an outside force im-
poses order upon an organization. Such order can refer
to the purpose or telos that defines the made order. This
is exogenous order because the purpose involved is inde-
pendent of the order, as opposed to being internal to or
immanent within the order. ‘Spontaneous orders’ by
contrast exhibit endogenous order; they do not have an
external purpose. Neither do they have a built-in telos.
Examples of spontaneous order include – the econ-
omy or market order, which Hayek describes as a dis-
covery procedure; the common law legal system, which
leads to the discovery of rules immanent within the so-
cial practice; the entire social or extended order, which
in Wittgensteinian fashion allows initiate learners to
become master linguistic practitioners by initiating
them into our shared form of life.
No amount of research will enable us to anticipate,
reconcile conflicts within, or plan construction of “a
rational economic order” (Hayek 1945). In order to do so,
we would need (1) perfect knowledge on the part of eco-
nomic planners, (2) the ability to define, without reference
to the understandings of individual economic actors andtheir contexts, an objective hierarchy of preferences, and
(3) the ability to determine the relative values of all
means and ends available to the planner(s). The complex
claim to perfect knowledge includes within it a claim to
know both the appropriate arrangement of all of that
knowledge, and the relationship between any two pieces
of knowledge, such that it is possible to derive, based
upon this knowledge, all of the possible equilibrium out-
comes for any set of inputs and possible outputs. The
question of relevance is tied to metaphysics. Only if the
structure of the world is accurately mirrored in the rules
of logical deduction is it conceivable that any single
mind or group of minds could possibly know what
knowledge is and is not relevant to a given plan. In
addition, the totality of possible outcomes of the differ-
ent uses that we might make of these inputs would have
to be deducible from the nature of the inputs them-
selves. Once we know the properties of the individual
inputs, the properties of all possible combinations of
inputs are deducible as well, at least in principle. The
second requirement of constructing a rational economic
order is the ability to define, without reference to the
understandings of individual economic actors and their
contexts, an objective hierarchy of preferences. This re-
quires calculation based not only on a given system of
preferences, but also on the possibility of rationally de-
ducing the correct course of action from the conditions
under which planning must take place. The first dimen-
sion of this requirement amounts to the assumption of
stable, transitive preferences, which are articulable in full
and in advance of choice and action and which are not
affected by the particular circumstances of individual
agents. Finally, we would need the ability to determine
the relative values of all means and ends available to the
planner in the absence of market institutions and pro-
cesses. As should be obvious, this also requires that the
order in question be understood as a teleocratic order,
within which there exists agreement about who has
authority to decide in individual cases what course of
action the members will pursue. Given this information,
it is possible in principle to know which ends are most
valuable and to decide which means to use in pursuit of
those ends. Of course, none of this is possible.
Consumer responsibility
The very semantics of the expression CSR carries with it
the presumption that corporations have responsibilities,
most especially to consumers but to others as well.
What about the responsibilities of consumers? A quick
search of the category consumer responsibility brings up
a whole host of articles on, you guessed it, what corpora-
tions owe to consumers or how consumers view CSR. It
is almost impossible to find much literature of what we
should expect from consumers themselves. The only
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can contribute to social policies of dealing with pollution
or private investment. This raises two questions: First, is
there a need for the category of consumer responsibility?
Second, if the answer to the previous question is yes,
then why is there so little work on this issue?
I suggest that the need for the category of consumer
responsibility is important. In order to understand this,
let us look at the concept of the Technological Project
(Capaldi 2004), the philosophical transition from the
view that humanity should conform to the natural order
to the view that humanity transforms nature to suit
human convenience, or in Descartes’ words that we are
here to make ourselves the masters and possessors of
nature. It is the Technological Project in conjunction
with the market economy that has led to the creation of
products and services (Schumpeter’s creative destruction)
that have transformed both the physical and social world
to such an extent that in an age of globalization we
now divide the world into developed and developing
economies. Add to this the humor associated with stories
about older people not knowing how to use the latest
technology. In short, we have a huge problem of con-
sumers confronted with products, services, and choices
for which they seem ill equipped. Are there consumers
who do not know how to use products responsibly? If so,
whose responsibility is it to deal with this problem?
There are several immediate responses designed to
defuse this category. First, it will be argued that the
Technological Project is itself at fault and that humanity
should embrace the GAIA world view and cease and de-
sist immediately from using the products and services of
the Technological Project. I do not think this is going to
happen because (a) there are serious intellectual problems
with the GAIA hypothesis, (b) we need the Technological
Project to promote awareness of environmental issues,
and (c) most especially it is too late to reject the Techno-
logical Project because modernity is committed to the
faith in technology – that is, we assume and act on the as-
sumption that future technology will solve the problems
created by the older technology. So, for example, the
creation of driverless cars will enable us to overcome the
irresponsible driving habits of some drivers. This will, in
turn, create a new set of problems – e.g., the malfunction
of computers that direct such cars. A deep look into the
modern world will reveal that it is too late to go back.
There is a significant difference between responsible en-
gagement with the environment and a wholesale rejection
of the Technological Project.
A second immediate response is, as usual, to (a) see
consumers as passive products of their environment and
(b) shift the responsibility to corporations, that is, more
CSR. Companies should be required to provide more in-
formation on products or print more and larger warninglabels or sponsor commercials warning about the misuse
of products. The clear difficulty with this solution, other
than the fact that it has not seemed to be effective, is
that we are all on information overload such that more
information being produced leads to less information be-
ing digested. We can add to this that many consumers
are fully aware of the dangers of misusing a product but
do so anyway. There is always the American version of
CSR of allowing the victims and even the perpetrators of
the deliberate misuse of products to sue the company
that produces the product. For example, there are nu-
merous examples of U.S. juries imposing damages on
companies even when those companies place warning
labels on products and go so far as to mechanically in-
hibit misuse (and the user disables the safety device)!
This not only leads to higher insurance costs and
thereby imposing additional costs on other consumers
but to removing valuable products from the market
place.
The most serious objection to these proposed remedies
is that they create a moral hazard. The Technological Pro-
ject has made the world better but more complicated. Can
we or should we expect the government and commercial
organizations or private firms alone to save us from our-
selves? Isn’t it time to focus on both educating consumers
and demanding more of them in exchange? Are there
cases where it is of vital importance to place the burden
on the consumer?
Consumers and medical technology: a case in point
There are many experimental pharmaceutical products
and technologies that could conceivably save or improve
lives. These products do not at present help everyone
and in some cases pose considerable risk. That is why
these medical technologies are still in various stages of
development and testing.
Who should decide whether or not to employ these
experimental products? Doctors? The government?
Pharmaceutical CSR personnel? Might it not make more
sense to have patients accept final responsibility for de-
ciding on the use of these products? Would this not also
be a voluntary benefit to experimenters?
The economics of CSR social transaction costs
Every firm deals with political and social transaction
costs. Political transaction costs are one reason firms,
and even whole industries, employ lobbyists. CSR is an
example of a social transaction cost. CSR in this context
means serving social interests without direct remuner-
ation but which is consistent with and indirectly serves
long-term investor value. There is another reason to
take this seriously, namely, it often obfuscates the role of
management, which is to look at a macro-context that
includes more than markets. Most of the CSR literature
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ure the value of CSR as opposed to the loss of resources
that could have been used for other purposes, including
charitable contributions by shareholders. If there is need
for an empirical study it should be to determine in some
fashion whether addressing social issues is done better
directly by Firms or by private philanthropy. This is one
issue that contrasts U.S. approaches from E.U. approaches.
We should also mention that in the U.S. we have CSR cor-
porate officers intently focused on elaborating procedures
to safeguard everyone but especially the firm from legal
action either on the part of the government or from friv-
olous law suits.Turning the tables
CSR as traditionally understood operates in two areas:
(1) reforming the work place and (2) helping address lar-
ger social issues that are not limited to the larger eco-
nomic and workplace environment.
Let us address the second area first. Most of us assume
that CSR goes in only one direction, namely, what firms
can do for non-profits as defined by the non-profit in-
dustry (CSR scholars and others). On the contrary,
should we consider the extent to which business leaders
can, may, and should, have a vital role in formulating
public policy or reforming non-profits such as univer-
sities? To be asked to contribute to the resolution of larger
social issues implies participating in the debate as to what
exactly those issues are, how the issues are to be diag-
nosed, and how to prescribe for them. Might business
leaders sometimes be in a better position to contribute to
that discussion than academics?
Those predisposed to be hostile to markets see CSR as
a way of shifting the costs of social policy to the private
sector in the face of tax payer rebellion. Often, they
assume that they personally will determine the CSR pol-
icies and that commercial firms will then foot the bill.
Might we argue that what we really need is for the busi-
ness community to become more actively involved in
defining social problems and helping in formulating and
implementing remedies. Might the business community
as a form of CSR advocate defunding universities that
promote ignorance and hostility to markets? Might it
seek (as is apparently the case now) to review univer-
sities and other educational and research institutions
from the point of view of a business? Specifically, what
are the objectives, how are they pursued, what are the
costs and benefits, rating teachers and scholars on their
productivity? In short, why assume that academicians
are the best judge of the academic world? After all, aca-
demics assume they are the best judge of the commercial
world as well as everything else. Short of the appeal to the
Enlightenment Project and social technology expertise, Ido not see how academics can respond to this question in
the affirmative.
With regard to the first area, CSR in the internal oper-
ation of the firm, should firms educate employees and
their families in why business operates the way it does in
a market economy? Should they insist on hiring MBA’s
only if they have completed a program that is pro-
market and pro-growth? Should they educate them (and
give money to business schools) to explain the evils of
corruption and of crony capitalism/socialism?
Another suggestion is to encourage firms to encourage
directors, employees, and shareholders to contribute to
philanthropies or non-profits that focus exclusively on ad-
dressing social problems. Rather than the firm’s money
and human capital, which might be focused on producing
profitable products and services, we encourage the devel-
opment of spiritual capital on the part of individuals to
contribute their own personal money, voluntary free time,
and personal expertise to both addressing social issues
and expanding the productivity of the market economy.
We do not have to share the same ideology to contribute
to this. We do not need to detract from a firm’s competi-
tive position to do this.
Something close to what I have in mind has been iden-
tified by Tierney (Tierney 2006).
“…to a new generation of entrepreneurs, there's no
conflict between capitalism and compassion…. The
movement's philosopher is John Mackey, the co-
founder of Whole Foods. Mackey is a passionate
environmentalist, an advocate of animal rights, a
promoter of sustainable development — and a self-
proclaimed libertarian….‘Corporations are lifting
billions of people out of poverty,’ he says. ‘Why are
they so hated?’ Mackey's answer is that capitalism
has a branding problem: its practitioners are experts
at marketing everything except their own system….
Mackey….thinks that socially conscious companies
like Whole Foods have flourished because their
founders, employees and customers want a corporation
to have grander goals than enriching shareholders….-
Before taking the company public, he told investors that
he was going to devote 5 percent of the profits to
philanthropy, so they can't complain now that he's
robbing them….It's smart of Google's founders to try
using capitalist tools to save the planet; the market's
discipline should keep their philanthropy from backing
too many lost causes.”
Imaginative CSR in the developing world
Multi-national firms can co-ordinate efforts to expose and
oppose corruption. They can publicize research already
being conducted by investment banks on which countries
have leaders who are promoting growth and which are
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posed by delays in implementing the true market econ-
omy, and identify individuals and groups facilitating and
advocating the delay. For example, we could also make a
list of the 10 worst CSR programs engaging in cosmetics
not substance (e.g., Starbucks, Body Shop, etc.). There is a
lot more to be done.
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